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I.   INTRODUCTION 
All litigation invariably requires financing. Let us be proactive 
and add Third-Party Litigation Finance (“TPLF”) providers to the list 
of major participants in the American legal system. TPLF is, general-
ly speaking, the process through which the inherent value of a legal 
claim is used to secure financing. TPLF providers almost exclusively 
offer nonrecourse financing, i.e., consumers are only obligated to re-
pay an investment to the extent their suit is successful. In its ideal 
form, providers recognize a litigation claim as a financial asset and 
offer its owners the flexibility to use it strategically in their business 
decisions. At this moment in time, however, contracts vary widely 
across this budding and unregulated industry. A characteristic split 
exists in the industry between consumer legal funding and invest-
ment in commercial claims, the latter including loans to lawyers and 
law firms. Investment in commercial claims is developing into a legit-
imate industry that provides historically unavailable solutions to 
businesses and lawyers involved in litigation. But intelligent regula-
tion is necessary to achieve maximum protection for consumers and 
streamline the industry’s growth. Most important, the implementa-
tion of intelligent regulation will protect the integrity of the Ameri-
can legal system. 
Part II first describes the initial split in the industry between con-
sumer legal funding and investment in commercial claims. Under-
standing this dichotomy is crucial because this Note focuses largely 
                                                                                                                  
   J.D., Cum Laude, Florida State University College of Law, 2015; B.S. Finance, 
Cum Laude, Florida State University, 2011. Born, Juno Beach, Florida. The author is 
grateful to M. Utset for the positive opportunity to form these ideas.  
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on investment in commercial claims. Consumer legal funding is in-
troduced and discussed because it persists as a feature of the TPLF 
landscape due to the lack of regulation of the industry as a whole. A 
picture of the market for investment in commercial claims is com-
pared to the market for consumer legal funding. The various ways 
that parties structure transactions are described along with the pur-
poses the parties intend to serve through the different structures. 
This Note also discusses the discrepancies involved in providing 
funding to defendant-consumers, as compared to plaintiff-consumers, 
and the challenges faced in expanding the TPLF industry to defense-
side risk transfers. A subset of investment in commercial claims is 
explored: TPLF transactions directly with lawyers and law firms, in-
cluding the distinct ethical challenges these arrangements pose.  
Part III considers the different legal doctrines that have been ap-
plied to TPLF transactions in the past and whether they remain ap-
plicable in today’s modern business context. There are two related 
legal doctrines that historically functioned to bar TPLF transac-
tions—maintenance and champerty. These doctrines essentially 
barred a person or entity from providing support to a litigant in re-
turn for pecuniary consideration related to the suit. The state law 
doctrine of usury has also been applied to TPLF transactions. Usury 
laws historically prohibited people and entities from charging unfair 
and exorbitant interest rates in market transactions. Because many 
TPLF transactions in the consumer legal funding industry involve 
variable and often extraordinary interest rates, courts have attempt-
ed to apply usury laws to invalidate TPLF transactions they consider 
unfair to individual consumers. With a similar aim of protecting con-
sumers, courts have also applied equitable principles of contract to 
TPLF transactions in their attempt to protect unwary consumers 
from falling victim to predatory consumer legal funding entities. The 
equitable common law contract principles of duress and undue influ-
ence are especially applicable to the unique transactions occurring 
throughout the TPLF industry. 
Part IV addresses popular arguments and complaints against es-
tablishment of the TPLF industry. The focus here is protecting the 
consumer, and many of these problems arise only in connection with 
consumer legal funding. The remainder of the market is comprised of 
sophisticated entities that are familiar with the litigation process and 
able to negotiate at arm’s length. Part IV largely addresses the ethi-
cal issues raised by TPLF transactions across the entire industry and 
current responses by authorities to those challenges.  
A related major criticism is discussed in Part V: TPLF’s effect on 
settlement incentives. TPLF’s effect on settlement is largely driven 
by the accessibility of information. The role of bargaining power is 
discussed and the effect of TPLF transactions on both access to in-
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formation and bargaining power is considered. Part V also considers 
how the introduction of TPLF will change parties’ actions and incen-
tives, whether these effects are desirable, and TPLF’s overall cumu-
lative effect on settlement in the American legal system. 
Part VI proposes a regulatory solution aimed at protecting con-
sumers and avoiding the negative externalities currently associated 
with the TPLF industry while promoting the value it creates and fa-
cilitating its overall growth.  
II.   TRANSACTION STRUCTURE 
TPLF transactions occur in a broad spectrum, but the market is 
differentiated according to the sophistication of the consumer. Law-
yers, law firms, and corporate parties to a lawsuit are sophisticated 
players akin to individuals and entities meeting the Securities and 
Exchange Commission’s (“SEC”) accredited investor standard.1 Ac-
credited investors are individuals with a net worth of over $1 million 
(including spouse but excluding primary residence) or individuals 
whose income exceeded $200,000 (or whose joint income with that of 
the spouse exceeded $300,000) each of the prior two years and who 
reasonably expect the same in the current year.2 These consumers 
have the knowledge and resources required to enter into negotiated, 
arms-length agreements with providers and are often repeat litigants 
familiar with the dynamics and incentives created by litigation. Indi-
vidual personal injury tort plaintiffs, however, are rarely sophisticat-
ed investors. Because they lack the ability and leverage to effectively 
negotiate with TPLF providers, they often enter into boilerplate con-
tracts that are to their detriment. Most of the legitimate issues  
raised regarding the TPLF industry stem from consequences in con-
nection with consumer legal funding but are absent from commercial 
investment. 
A.   Consumer Legal Funding 
In this transaction structure, a TPLF firm typically takes a finan-
cial interest in a plaintiff’s personal injury or other relatively small 
claim.3 Although attorneys generally offer these plaintiffs contingent 
fee arrangements (itself a form of financing), plaintiffs’ injuries often 
leave them out of work and with little money to cover simple living or 
                                                                                                                  
 1. See Michael L. Monson, The Evolution and Future of the Accredited Investor 
Standard for Individuals, UTAH B.J., Nov./Dec. 2010, at 36, 37-38 (setting forth the history 
of the SEC accredited investor standard and its changes).  
 2. See 17 C.F.R. § 230.501(a) (2014).  
 3. See Douglas R. Richmond, Other People’s Money: The Ethics of Litigation Funding, 
56 MERCER L. REV. 649, 649-50 (2005) (discussing the prevalence of the litigation “loan” 
market in the United States).  
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medical expenses. It is often the case that these individuals find the 
most valuable asset they own is their contingent claim to a future 
award of damages. They use this claim arising from their injury as 
security in a transaction with consumer legal funders. The consumer 
contracts to repay the provider the principal amount forwarded plus 
interest out of any recovery.4 The only thing distinguishing these 
providers from settlement factoring companies is the fact that con-
sumer legal funders take interests in claims that have yet to be re-
solved or reduced to judgment.5 
Some serious concerns raised by critics of the TPLF industry are 
unique consequences resulting from consumer legal funding. Other 
issues relate more generally to the concept of litigation finance and 
apply to both consumer legal funding and investment in commercial 
claims. These latter issues are addressed in detail later.6 A legitimate 
concern in consumer legal funding transactions is the vulnerability of 
the consumer.7 There exists a valid concern that these consumers, 
typically victims of accidents, will be further victimized by sophisti-
cated entities that induce them to enter into contracts of adhesion 
that they do not fully understand.8 A massive body of law, in the form 
of the Uniform Commercial Code (“UCC”), was created and adopted 
by the majority of states in recognition of the real threats consumers 
face on a daily basis in exercising their freedom of contract.9 An effort 
was therefore made to establish a functional framework of laws that 
reduce the vulnerability of the average American consumer, provide 
protections meant to prevent abuse in the first place, and offer sub-
stantive remedies to make victims whole after the fact.10 This Note 
proposes a regulatory solution to some of the issues resulting  
from investment in commercial claims and loans to law firms.11 The   
                                                                                                                  
 4. See Julia H. McLaughlin, Litigation Funding: Charting a Legal and Ethical 
Course, 31 VT. L. REV. 615, 620-21, 621 n.21 (2007) (describing the basic structure of con-
sumer legal funding transactions).  
 5. See id. at 620 (stating that the “potential recovery, if any, secures the LFC’s inter-
est). See generally Adam F. Scales, Against Settlement Factoring? The Market in Tort 
Claims Has Arrived, 2002 WIS. L. REV. 859 (2002) (explaining the approach taken by set-
tlement factoring companies and the increasing trend of asset securitization).  
 6. See infra pp. 1056-60.   
 7. See Adam Liptak, Lenders to Those Who Sue Are Challenged on Rates, N.Y. TIMES 
(May 19, 2003), http://www.nytimes.com/2003/05/19/us/lenders-to-those-who-sue-are-
challenged-on-rates.html (discussing the exploitation of vulnerable consumers).  
 8. See Fausone v. U.S. Claims, Inc., 915 So. 2d 626, 630 (Fla. 2d DCA 2005). 
 9. See generally U.C.C. (AM. LAW INST. & NAT’L CONFERENCE ON UNIF. STATE LAWS 
2014).   
 10. See 15A AM. JUR. 2D Commercial Code § 2, Westlaw (database updated Nov. 2015) 
(describing the general purpose and effect of the UCC framework).  
 11. See infra pp. 1066-69.  
2016]  THIRD-PARTY LITIGATION FINANCE 1047 
 
solution tacitly assumes the outright prohibition of the consumer  
legal funding niche of TPLF or, at least, stringent regulation based 
on usury12 and UCC principles.  
B.   Investment in Commercial Claims and Loans to Lawyers 
The other half of the TPLF market is comprised of fewer, but larg-
er and more sophisticated providers that invest in complex commer-
cial claims including contract, antitrust, and intellectual property. 
These providers approach the investment in much the same way pri-
vate equity firms and hedge funds approach investments: by estab-
lishing a structured and comprehensive review process used to eval-
uate potential investments. They conduct significant due diligence 
before making a decision to invest because they often invest substan-
tial sums.13 These providers include both private and publicly traded 
companies that typically invest tens of millions of dollars in claims 
owned by corporate entities represented by top tier law firms.14 Jurid-
ica and Burford are excellent examples of TPLF providers having 
achieved successes validated by the public markets.15 
The most straightforward example of investment in commercial 
claims is a situation in which the provider offers financing used to 
satisfy legal fees incurred in the litigation of a claim.16 Consumers 
contemplating this type of financing are usually repeat litigant cor-
porate entities.17 Sometimes a party plaintiff approaches a provider 
at the outset of a suit because his or her opponent retained high qual-
ity, expensive legal counsel, and they are simply unable to afford 
hourly fees of comparable counsel.18 In this circumstance, the provid-
er offers the consumer the flexibility to retain quality counsel, equal-
                                                                                                                  
 12. See infra pp. 1054-55.  
 13. See, e.g., Funding Overview, BENTHAM IMF, http://www.benthamimf.com/docs/ 
default-source/default-document-library/bentham-funding-overview.pdf?sfvrsn=10 (discuss-
ing the comprehensive due diligence process Bentham Capital LLC undertakes before mak-
ing an investment) (last visited Feb. 24, 2016).  
 14. See generally Steven Garber, Alternative Litigation Financing in the United 
States: Issues, Knowns, and Unknowns 1, 16 (RAND, Occasional Paper, 2010), 
http://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/occasional_papers/2010/RAND_OP306.pdf 
(discussing the extent to which sophisticated TPLF consumers borrow in comparison to the 
value of their litigation claims).  
 15. See, e.g., BURFORD CAPITAL LLC, http://www.burfordcapital.com (last visited  
Feb. 24, 2016); JURIDICIA INVESTMENTS LTD, http://www.juridicainvestments.com (last 
visited Feb. 24, 2016).  
 16. See Marco de Morpurgo, A Comparative Legal and Economic Approach to Third-
Party Litigation Funding, 19 CARDOZO J. INT’L & COMP. L. 343, 352 (2011).  
 17. See Maya Steinitz, Whose Claim Is This Anyway? Third-Party Litigation Funding, 
95 MINN. L. REV. 1268, 1304 (2011). 
 18. See JONATHAN T. MOLOT, BURFORD CAPITAL LLC, THEORY AND PRACTICE IN 
LITIGATION RISK 8 (2012), http://www.burfordcapital.com/wp-content/uploads/2015/01/ 
Booklet-Theory-and-Practice.pdf.  
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izing the playing field and permitting the suit to proceed to a deter-
mination on the merits instead of settling based on dynamics unre-
lated to those merits.19  In another situation, a consumer may ap-
proach a provider in the middle of a case when fees have proved more 
expensive than anticipated and the consumer has accumulated unpaid 
legal bills.20 Threatened with the withdrawal of its counsel and the 
agency costs associated with retaining substitute counsel, the provider 
covers the consumer’s arrearages and finances the cost associated with 
completing the litigation.21 In this way, providers empower businesses 
to retain high quality legal counsel by offering the resources necessary 
for that counsel to function efficiently and effectively. 
Regardless of whether a consumer is a repeat litigant, litigation 
can severely affect a business’ operations.22 Management teams excel 
at running large-scale businesses and ongoing litigation has a debili-
tative effect on their ability to run them smoothly and profitably. Lit-
igation is a major distraction to any business entity.23 The opportuni-
ty costs involved in diverting capital to cover the cost of litigation can 
be overwhelming to the largest of these entities and fatal to the rest. 
Providers can relieve some of the pressure litigation places on busi-
nesses by providing cash for purposes other than payment of legal 
fees.24 The managers of a small business might think they have a le-
gitimate claim but might not be able to afford to litigate the claim 
while contemporaneously funding their operations. Providers enable 
these businesses to litigate their claim on the merits while financing 
the company’s operations until recovery.25 Larger businesses might 
be able to afford to litigate their claims but could benefit from addi-
tional capital to counter the effect litigation has on their financials. 
Under Generally Accepted Accounting Principles, legal fees are 
treated as ordinary expenses while recoveries are treated as extraor-
dinary items.26 The practical but illogical result for businesses is that 
the legal fees necessarily paid to litigate their claim reduce earnings, 
but any recovery amount cannot be included in earnings.27 Business-
                                                                                                                  
 19. See discussion infra pp. 1063-66 (discussing TPLF’s effect on settlement  
dynamics). 
 20. See MOLOT, supra note 18, at 7-8. 
 21. See id.  
 22. Cf. Alan J. Fink, Litigation Management Model Developed by Corporate Counsel 
Section, N.Y. ST. B.J., Jan. 1996, at 34, 34 (describing the ultimate management goal as 
avoiding litigation in the first place, whenever reasonably possible).  
 23. See Business Law, HAWKES LAW FIRM, P.S., hawkeslawcenter.com/practice-
areas/business-law/ (last visited Feb. 24, 2016). 
 24. See MOLOT, supra note 18, at 8.  
 25. See id.  
 26. See id. at 11.  
 27. See Robert W. Wood, Taxation of Litigation Recoveries, 47 AM. JUR. Trials 591,  
§ 8 Westlaw (database updated Nov. 2015).  
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es undergoing a recapitalization or reorganization use financing from 
providers to counter the effect of this perverse accounting treatment 
on their operations.28 Providers understand the effects of litigation on 
large-scale businesses and are uniquely qualified to create and offer 
financing arrangements specifically aimed at solving the problems 
faced by these businesses.  
Not all financing arrangements involve plaintiffs. Corporate de-
fendants facing lawsuits encounter problems equal in scope to enti-
ties litigating claims as plaintiffs. But defendants do not have a po-
tential judgment to use as security for financing. Corporate defend-
ants are interested in a different type of risk transfer. These busi-
nesses want to mitigate the hazardous effects of a potential adverse 
judgment, or of a worse-than-expected adverse judgment. Because 
there is no potential judgment to use as security, these arrangements 
are similar in nature to insurance.29 Corporate defendants are effec-
tively interested in purchasing an insurance policy covering the risks 
associated with an adverse judgment. Traditional insurers have been 
reluctant to insure this risk because they are unable to accurately 
underwrite it.30 Traditional insurers are able to accurately price risk 
by grouping together similar policyholders who bear similar risks.31 A 
corporate defendant is a unique entity facing a completely unique 
(and foreign, to the traditional insurer) risk in the form of a lawsuit.32 
Traditional insurers do not possess the legal expertise to conduct the 
due diligence necessary to accurately underwrite the risk associated 
with an adverse judgment to a corporate defendant. Providers, on the 
other hand, possess both the legal expertise and the financial fluency 
to underwrite this type of risk.33 What providers lack is the sheer 
magnitude of assets required to insure such massive risk. Still, there 
exist examples of providers and insurance companies successfully 
collaborating to offer insurance solutions to corporate defendants.34 
Partnering with a traditional insurer can enable a TPLF provider 
to insure the entire risk a corporate defendant faces.35 Consider the 
                                                                                                                  
 28. See MOLOT, supra note 18, at 11.  
 29. See id. at 14-15; see also Steinitz, supra note 17, at 1311. See generally Morpurgo, 
supra note 16, at 353 (describing traditional insurers’ approach to before-the-event and 
after-the-event litigation insurance).   
 30. See MOLOT, supra note 18, at 6. 
 31. See id. 
 32. Jonathan T. Molot, The Feasibility of Litigation Markets, 89 IND. L.J. 171, 188 
(2014). 
 33. See, e.g., MOLOT, supra note 18, at 15 (noting that Burford Capital LLC recently 
invested $10 million to essentially insure a commercial plaintiff that had already won a 
jury verdict worth more than $50 million but was being appealed).  
 34. See id.  
 35. See id. at 15 (stating that Burford Captial LLC was able to offer a litigant nearly 
$40 million to protect a $50 million jury verdict that was being appealed by partnering 
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effect that litigation risk has on the corporate defendant who is a 
party to a pending merger or acquisition. An entire deal may be scut-
tled because the target is subject to an unacceptable and uncertain 
amount of pending or ongoing litigation risk.36 By enabling a target to 
transfer some or all of this risk, TPLF providers offer a crucial solu-
tion to a complex problem for corporate defendants.  
A specialized subset of these providers also makes loans directly to 
lawyers and law firms.37 These loans are secured by firm assets and 
are distinct in that way from financing arrangements made directly 
with party plaintiffs or defendants.38 Collateral ranges from furniture 
and fixtures to accounts receivable or a percentage of the firm’s con-
tingent fee in a current case. Entire law firms dedicate their legal 
practice to matters lending themselves to contingent fee arrange-
ments. While such firms routinely outlay funds necessary to litigate a 
suit, occasionally they must turn down business they are incapable of 
financing.39 Only the largest law firms are able to finance cases re-
quiring millions of dollars in disbursements. Many firms specializing 
in contingent fee matters are financially unable to assume that level 
of risk despite seeing a strong claim on the merits due to cash-flow 
problems or otherwise.40 Historically, such a firm would turn to tradi-
tional lenders including banks and insurance companies in an effort 
to finance these cases, but few law firms have the type of relationship 
with a bank necessary to facilitate such large scale financing.41 More-
over, many of these traditional sources of credit simply dried up fol-
lowing the financial crisis.42 TPLF providers, relying on their crucial 
legal and financial expertise, are willing to provide sufficient capital 
to reduce a law firm’s exposure to a suitable amount, allowing the 
law firm to proceed on a contingent fee basis.  
TPLF providers also offer financing to lawyers to ameliorate cir-
cumstances created by the economics of law practice. As more law 
firms approach the practice of law as a business rather than a profes-
sion, it has become commonplace for practice groups within large 
firms to have disagreements with firm management about fee ar-
                                                                                                                  
with an insurance company and that this transaction structure allowed the plaintiff to use 
$10 million dollars to secure protection “far beyond what a $300 million fund could do for a 
single case”). 
 36. See id. at 6.  
 37. See Jasminka Kalajdzic et al., Justice for Profit: A Comparative Analysis of Aus-
tralian, Canadian and U.S. Third Party Litigation Funding, 61 AM. J. COMP. L. 93, 128-30 
(2013).  
 38. See id.  
 39. See Elizabeth Chamblee Burch, Financiers as Monitors in Aggregate Litigation, 87 
N.Y.U. L. REV. 1273, 1306 (2012).  
 40. See id. 
 41. See id.  
 42. See id.  
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rangements and other financial matters.43 Firm management may be 
unhappy with a practice group’s preference for contingent fee ar-
rangements and may pressure them to accept more hourly fee busi-
ness.44 Management teams of TPLF providers include successful law-
yers with experience at top-flight firms who are intimately familiar 
with the economic issues involved in the practice of law.45 These pro-
viders are in a unique position to offer solutions for the problems cre-
ated by these issues. The provider may agree to finance the group’s 
entire portfolio of contingent fee matters, significantly reducing the 
law firm’s risk exposure and appeasing management.46 The practice 
group may simply borrow from the provider (using its contingent 
share of suit proceeds as security) and give the borrowed cash direct-
ly to firm management in lieu of accepting more hourly fee busi-
ness.47 Where the personalities and risk profiles are too volatile to 
continue under a single roof, the provider can finance the practice 
group’s split from the law firm and costs associated with the estab-
lishment of a new firm.48  
III.   LEGAL OBSTACLES TO THE SUCCESS OF TPLF 
Today’s TLPF industry operates in an uncertain legal gray area. 
The undeniable trend, however, embraces the proliferation of TPLF.49 
The industry does not yet enjoy much notoriety in this country de-
spite growing at an exponential rate across the world50 since a 2006 
landmark decision of the Australian High Court.51 TPLF has been 
embraced in Australia, Germany, and the United Kingdom for some 
time, as traditional prohibitions on maintenance and champerty were 
abolished by statute in those jurisdictions years ago.52 The industry’s 
legal status remains undefined in the United States largely because 
the industry is so new that the most relevant existing legal frame-
works are woefully inapplicable to this cross-discipline business con-
text. The common law principles of champerty and maintenance once 
                                                                                                                  
 43. See MOLOT, supra note 18, at 11-12.  
 44. See id. at 12. 
 45. See, e.g., Our Team, BENTHAM CAPITAL LLC, http://www.benthamimf.com/about-
us/our-team (last visited Feb. 24, 2016).  
 46. See MOLOT, supra note 18, at 11-12.  
 47. See id. (stating that practice groups being pressured by firm management to ac-
cept more hourly fee work have “sought financing in an effort to . . . bring in enough cash to 
satisfy firm management”).  
 48. See id.  
 49. See Victoria A. Shannon, Harmonizing Third-Party Litigation Funding Regula-
tion, 36 CARDOZO L. REV. 861, 864 (2015) (mentioning TPLF’s “increasing prevalence”).   
 50. Id. at 869.  
 51. See Campbells Cash & Carry Pty Ltd v. Fostif Pty Ltd [2006] HCA 41 (Austl.). 
 52. See Shannon, supra note 50, at 869, 871.  
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barred third parties from offering financing to litigants.53 However, 
many courts around the country nowadays are unwilling to bar mod-
ern TPLF agreements under these ancient doctrines.54 Moreover, the 
nonrecourse nature of TPLF agreements governing investment in 
commercial claims prohibits courts from using usury principles to 
invalidate them.55 Equitable contract principles of duress and undue 
influence may function to bar unconscionable consumer legal funding 
agreements, however.56  
A.   Champerty and Maintenance 
“Champerty and maintenance are common-law doctrines, often re-
ferred to as ‘antique laws,’ which have long prohibited the outside 
financing of litigation.”57 Maintenance refers broadly to any assis-
tance to another person in their prosecution of a lawsuit.58 Champer-
ty is a specific type of maintenance and refers to the support of a law-
suit with the expectation of pecuniary gain.59 The term is used to  
describe:  
[T]he purpose of stirring up litigation and strife, encouraging oth-
ers either to bring actions or to make defenses which they have no 
right to make, and the term seems to be confined to the intermed-
dling in a suit of a stranger or of one not having any privity or con-
cern in the subject matter, or standing in no relation of duty to the 
suitor.60  
Today, courts use the terms nearly synonymously.61 The historical 
justification for the prohibition was to prevent what is recognized to-
day as abuse of process.62 The policy goals driving prohibitions on 
                                                                                                                  
 53. See id. at 873-74.  
 54. See Mariel Rodak, It’s About Time: A Systems Thinking Analysis of the Litigation 
Finance Industry and its Effect on Settlement, 155 U. PA. L. REV. 503, 511 (2006).  
 55. See Shannon, supra note 50, at 892.  
 56. Rodak, supra note 54, at 513. 
 57. Jacqueline Sheridan, Champerty and Maintenance in the Modern Era: How Liti-
gation Funding Groups are Changing the Landscape, DINSMORE (Jan. 22, 2016), http:// 
www.dinsmore.com/champerty_and_maintenance_modern_era/ (“The doctrines of cham-
perty and maintenance date back to the middle ages, and some argue as early as the an-
cient Greece and ancient Roman eras.” (citing Jason Lyon, Revolution in Process: Third-
Party Funding of American Litigation, 58 UCLA L. REV. 571 (2010))). 
 58. Paul H. Rubin, Third-Party Financing of Litigation, 38 N. KY. L. REV. 673, 674 
(2011) (“Maintenance is assistance in a lawsuit by someone who has no interest in the 
case.”).  
 59. See id. (“[C]hamperty is an agreement between a litigant and a stranger by which 
the stranger pursues the claim in return for a share of the proceeds . . . .”).  
 60. L. S. Tellier, Annotation, Assertion of Defense of Champerty in Action by Champer-
tous Assignee, 22 A.L.R. 2d 1000, § 1[a] (1952) (citing 10 AM. JUR. 548, Champerty and 
Maintenance § 1). 
 61. See id.  
 62. See Wolford v. Tankersley, 695 P.2d 1201, 1222 (Idaho 1984). 
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champerty are now largely accomplished in other ways, such as 
through court rules and model rules of professional conduct.63 These 
concerns do not outweigh the benefits the TPLF industry has to offer.  
As the business landscape in this country has developed in com-
plexity over the last decade, courts have increasingly been unwilling 
to apply the doctrine of champerty to invalidate agreements between 
litigants and third parties. Courts as early as 1824 observed that 
state laws sufficiently addressed problems caused by maintenance 
and champerty.64 Around the turn of the nineteenth century, courts 
began embracing champertous agreements not involving a party’s 
attorney.65 This trend continued into the early twentieth century, as 
champertous agreements involving a party’s own lawyer remained 
circumspect in the eyes of courts.66 By the middle of the twentieth 
century, contingency fee agreements had been carved out as a de fac-
to exception to the traditional doctrine of champerty.67 These agree-
ments would without question be permitted in today’s modern legal 
practice as contingency fee agreements.68 
More recently, many state supreme courts have explicitly ruled 
that their common law permits agreements previously considered 
champertous.69 Some states were not even willing to concede that the 
prohibition on champerty traveled to this country with the early Eng-
lish common law. 70  Other states abandoned the champerty re-
strictions adopted from the early common law.71 The Massachusetts 
Supreme Court dissolved its prohibition on champerty in 1997, citing 
a systematic change in the way society viewed litigation.72 Florida 
courts refused to agree that TPLF agreements “officious[ly] inter-
meddle[d]” in suits, gutting the claim that the specific arrangement 
                                                                                                                  
 63. See Saladini v. Righellis, 687 N.E.2d 1224, 1227 (Mass. 1997) (holding that the 
champerty doctrine is no longer needed because there are now other mechanisms in place 
that can prevent the same evils the champerty doctrine was designed to protect against); 
Osprey, Inc. v. Cabana Ltd. P’ship, 523 S.E.2d 269, 277 (S.C. 2000) (eliminating champerty 
as a defense because other well-developed principles of law can more effectively accomplish 
the goals champerty aims to achieve).  
 64. See Thallhimer v. Brinckerhoff, 3 Cow. 623, 624 (N.Y. 1824) (finding that an 
agreement was void based on the state’s “more explicit” statute, rather than the common-
law doctrine of champerty).  
 65. See, e.g., Brown v. Bigne, 28 P. 11, 13 (Or. 1891).  
 66. See In re Gilman’s Adm’x, 167 N.E. 437, 439 (N.Y. 1929).  
 67. See Max Radin, Maintenance by Champerty, 24 CAL. L. REV. 48, 70-71 (1936).  
 68. See Anthony J. Sebok, The Inauthentic Claim, 64 VAND. L. REV. 61, 99 (2011). 
 69. See Rodak, supra note 54, at 511. 
 70. See, e.g., Rice v. Farrell, 28 A.2d 7, 8 (Conn. 1942) (“[T]he common law doctrines of 
champerty and maintenance as applied to civil actions have never been adopted in this 
state . . . .”). 
 71. See, e.g., Fastenau v. Engel, 240 P.2d 1173, 1175 (Colo. 1952); Polo ex rel. Shipley 
v. Gotchel, 542 A.2d 947 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 1987). 
 72. See Saladini v. Righellis, 687 N.E.2d 1224, 1226-27 (Mass. 1997).  
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in that case was champertous.73 In New York, a partial assignment of 
proceeds from a lawsuit in exchange for services was upheld in 
1993.74  
Over half of jurisdictions in the United States now permit some 
form of champerty, subject to certain limitations.75 The limitations 
typically disallow champertous agreements promoting frivolous law-
suits or based on improper motives.76 An important limitation prohib-
its champertous agreements that intermeddle with the administra-
tion of litigation. Examples of intermeddling include reserving the 
authority to choose counsel, directing trial strategy, and controlling 
settlement decisions.77 Given the apparent trend and the fact that 
more than half of the states now permit champerty in one form or 
another, dated prohibitions on champerty seem to pose little threat to 
the expansion of the TPLF industry in this country. There remain, 
however, a handful of states that still enforce prohibitions on  
champerty.78 
B.   Usury 
Usury laws prohibit lenders from charging exorbitant interest 
rates in debt transactions.79 Typically these laws provide a maximum 
rate at which interest may be charged. Those rates depend on a 
number of factors including the category of lender involved. There is 
no federal legal framework for usury law. Instead, state laws vary 
widely regarding permissible maximum rates and the extent to which 
they apply to different lenders, whether commercial or consumer. 
Sometimes even nonrecourse financing is described as a loan.80 This 
                                                                                                                  
 73. See Kraft v. Mason, 668 So. 2d 679, 682-83 (Fla. 4th DCA 1996).  
 74. See Leon v. Martinez, 638 N.E. 2d 511, 513 (N.Y. 1994).  
 75. See Sebok, supra note 68, at 98-99. 
 76. See id. at 102-05 (referring to these limitations as “malice maintenance” and argu-
ing against the prohibition of malice maintenance due to the existence of other legal doc-
trines and rules). 
 77. See id. at 109.  
 78. See, e.g., Lott v. Kees, 165 So. 2d 106, 110-11 (Ala. 1964); Johnson v. Wright, 682 
N.W. 2d 671, 679-80 (Minn. Ct. App. 2004) (upholding the validity of the champerty doc-
trine in Minnesota and citing to other states that have refused to abolish the champerty 
doctrine, including Arizona, Lingel v. Olbin, 8 P.3d 1163, 1167-68 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2000), 
Ohio, Rancman v. Interim Settlement Funding Corp., 789 N.E.2d 217 (Ohio 2003), and 
Pennsylvania, Fleetwood Area Sch. Dist. v. Berks Cty. Bd. of Assessment Appeals, 821 A.2d 
1268, 1273 (Pa. Cmmw. Ct. 2003)).   
 79. See George Steven Swan, The Economics of Usury and the Litigation Funding 
Industry: Rancman v. Interim Settlement Funding Corp., 28 OKLA. CITY U. L. REV. 753, 
765 n.102 (2003) (“Regulations that specify a maximum rate of interest that an institution 
can charge for lending money are known as usury laws.” (quoting W. KIP VISCUSI ET AL., 
ECONOMICS OF REGULATION AND ANTITRUST 518 (3d ed. 2001))). 
 80. See, e.g., The Ass’n of the Bar of the City of N.Y. Comm. on Prof’l Ethics, Formal 
Op. 2011-2 (2011) (“This opinion addresses non-recourse litigation loans, i.e. financing re-
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oxymoronic rhetoric used by legal authorities contributes to the con-
fusion presently surrounding the industry in this country. TPLF pro-
viders indicate that the nonrecourse nature of the financing they 
provide prevents the financing from being characterized as a debt 
transaction. 81  Providers insist they are making an investment or 
simply purchasing partial assignment of a claim, not making loans.82 
It follows that whether usury laws may function to invalidate TPLF 
agreements will depend on whether courts characterize TPLF financ-
ing as loans or investments. 
In the context of consumer usury laws, courts generally agree one 
of the hallmarks of a loan or debt transaction is the absolute obliga-
tion to repay the funds advanced.83 Some courts, however, simply see 
nonrecourse TPLF agreements as a type of loan.84 Such a characteri-
zation may permit the application of state usury laws to certain 
TPLF agreements. These laws were enacted to protect vulnerable 
consumers against deceitful lenders. They function well for this pur-
pose in the consumer legal funding context. Petitioned by large con-
sumer legal funders in 2010, the Colorado Attorney General issued a 
declaratory order holding nonrecourse debt agreements subject to 
usury regulations under Colorado’s Uniform Consumer Credit Code.85  
                                                                                                                  
paid by a litigant only in the event he or she settles the case or is awarded a judgment 
upon completion of the litigation.”).  
 81. See ABA Comm’n on Ethics 20/20, White Paper on Alternative Litigation Finance 
13 (draft), http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/administrative/ethics_2020/ 
20111019_draft_alf_white_paper_posting.authcheckdam.pdf (“This product does not fall 
into a traditional ‘loan product’ category as it is non-recourse.” (quoting Comments of Oasis 
Legal Fin., LLC to the ABA Working Grp. on Alt. Litig. Fin. (Jan. 18, 2011))). 
 82. These claims only ring true with respect to providers investing in large-scale, 
commercial lawsuits. As part of a bespoke agreement, these providers typically negotiate a 
set percentage return. Consumer legal funders, however, often set a rate of interest that 
compounds monthly. While the “loan” is technically nonrecourse, this arrangement ex-
pands the vulnerability of consumers that enter these agreements. Further, financing of-
fered directly to lawyers and law firms is usually a secured transaction, where the law firm 
will provide as collateral firm assets or part of its contingent fee.  
 83. See BURFORD CAPITAL LLC, SUMMARY OF FINDINGS: SECOND ANNUAL LITIGATION 
FINANCING SURVEY (2013), at 12, n.47 (2014) (“The second element of a traditional usury 
case is the debtor’s absolute obligation to repay the principal amount of the money trans-
ferred to him or her.” (quoting 1-6 CONSUMER CREDIT LAW MANUAL § 6.08 (2011))); Odell v. 
Legal Bucks, LLC, 665 S.E. 2d 767, 777 (N.C. Ct. App. 2008) (stating that a contract where 
the “borrower’s repayment of the principal is subject to a contingency is not considered a 
‘loan,’ because the terms of the transaction do not necessarily require that the borrower 
‘repay the sum lent’ ” (quoting State ex rel. Cooper v. NCSS Loans, Inc., 624 S.E.2d 371, 
374 (2005))).  
 84. See Lawsuit Financial, L.L.C. v. Curry, 683 N.W.2d 233, 239 (Mich. Ct. App. 
2004).  
 85. See ABA COMM’N ON ETHICS 20/20, INFORMATIONAL REPORT TO THE HOUSE OF 
DELEGATES 13 (2012), http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/administrative/ 
ethics_2020/20111212_ethics_20_20_alf_white_paper_final_hod_informational_report. 
authcheckdam.pdf. 
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C.   Contract Principles 
The traditional equitable doctrines of undue influence and duress 
aim to achieve similar policy goals as the doctrines of maintenance 
and champerty.86 The applicable form of duress functions to invali-
date contracts where one party makes an improper threat that in-
duces the other party to accept the contract terms and the accepting 
party has no reasonable alternative to manifesting their assent.87 The 
essence of this equitable doctrine is to protect consumers from in-
ducement by improper threat. Such an improper threat, however, 
does not amount to duress if the victim has a reasonable alternative 
and fails to take advantage of it.88 The threat must arouse such fear 
as would preclude a party from exercising its free will and judgment, 
but it is enough if the threat actually induces assent on the part of 
one who has no reasonable alternative.89 This type of duress could 
potentially be applicable in the consumer legal funding context where 
a consumer has filed a lawsuit and cannot afford typical living or 
medical expenses. The consumer will be faced with a decision either 
to drop the suit or enter into a contract with a consumer legal fund-
ing entity. If the entity uses that leverage to impermissibly induce 
the consumer into entering the contract, a reviewing court may very 
well consider such action within the definition of duress and void the 
contract. If a reviewing court believes the consumer has any reasona-
ble alternative to entering the consumer legal funding contract, how-
ever, even an improper threat would not function to void the contract 
for duress. 
Undue influence involves unfair persuasion instead of an improp-
er threat and contemplates a milder form of pressure than duress. 
Undue influence is the unfair persuasion of a party who is under the 
domination of the person or entity exercising their influence.90 A con-
sumer in the scenario just described could be considered under the 
domination of the provider if they had no other ability to cover living 
expenses while prosecuting their suit. The extent to which persua-
sion is unfair depends on a variety of circumstances, including the 
unfairness of the resulting bargain, the unavailability of independent 
advice, and the susceptibility of the person persuaded.91 These factors 
are not by themselves controlling, however.92 A reviewing court may 
                                                                                                                  
 86. See Paul Bond, Making Champerty Work: An Invitation to State Action, 150 U. PA. 
L. REV. 1297, 1307 (2002). 
 87. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 175(1) (AM. LAW INST. 1981).  
 88. Id. at cmt. b. 
 89. Id.  
 90. Id. § 177(1).  
 91. Id. at cmt. b.  
 92. See id.  
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be more likely to find the unfair persuasion contemplated by undue 
influence than the improper threat involved in duress. Regardless, 
the strict requirements of satisfying these doctrines likely render 
them inapplicable to the negotiated agreements reached between so-
phisticated parties that govern investment in commercial claims.93 
Courts could, however, potentially use these doctrines to nullify  
contracts between consumer legal funding entities and individual 
parties. 
IV.   CURRENT ATTITUDES 
Trade associations and legal authorities have begun to give more 
attention to the TPLF industry in recent years. In 2012, the United 
States Chamber of Commerce’s Institute for Legal Reform (“ILR”) 
published a report highlighting the purported threats the TPLF in-
dustry creates and describing it as a “clear and present danger to the 
impartial and efficient administration of civil justice in the United 
States.”94 Despite its negative outlook on the industry, the report in-
cludes some regulatory measures even proponents of the industry 
would agree are necessary to ensure its continued viability.95 Law-
makers have yet to respond to the regulatory proposals. In August of 
2014, the ILR issued another report proposing a regulatory scheme 
for the Australian TPLF industry.96 The American Bar Association 
Commission on Ethics 20/20 (“Commission”) issued a draft white pa-
per addressing the ethical and professional responsibility issues 
raised by the emerging TPLF industry.97 The Commission concluded 
that the TPLF industry does not run afoul of ethical and professional 
responsibility rules governing lawyers but suggested lawyers in-
volved in TPLF be especially careful to maintain their independent 
professional judgment and make decisions in their clients’ best inter-
est, all things considered.98 Most recently, in April 2014, representa-
tives of the ILR, American Insurance Association, American Tort Re-
form Association, Lawyers for Civil Justice, and National Association 
of Manufacturers penned a letter to the Secretary of the Committee 
                                                                                                                  
 93. See id. § 208 cmt. d (“A bargain is not unconscionable merely because the parties 
to it are unequal in bargaining position . . . .”). 
 94. JOHN H. BEISNER & GARY A. RUBIN, U.S. CHAMBER INST. FOR LEGAL REFORM, 
STOPPING THE SALE ON LAWSUITS: A PROPOSAL TO REGULATE THIRD-PARTY INVESTMENTS 
IN LITIGATION 1 (2012), http://www.instituteforlegalreform.com/uploads/sites/1/TPLF_ 
Solutions.pdf. 
 95. Some of these suggestions include measures addressing consumer protection, 
ownership of providers, and confidentiality. 
 96. NICK MAVRAKIS ET AL., U.S. CHAMBER INST. FOR LEGAL REFORM, AN OVERSIGHT REGIME 
FOR LITIGATION FUNDING IN AUSTRALIA 1 (2014), http://www instituteforlegalreform.com/ 
uploads/sites/1/LitinAUS.pdf. 
 97. ABA Comm’n on Ethics 20/20, supra note 81. 
 98. See id. at 4-5. 
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on Rules of Practice and Procedure for the Administrative Office of 
the United States Courts proposing a TPLF disclosure requirement 
be added to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.99 The Committee 
will consider the proposal.  
 Certain arguments against the TPLF industry recur in the reports 
mentioned above and throughout the academic literature addressing 
TPLF. This Part identifies and addresses these arguments concern-
ing the TPLF industry and attempts to show how the industry’s neg-
ative externalities can be managed while preserving the value the 
industry creates for consumers. The most popular argument against 
TPLF is that it increases the amount of frivolous claims filed in the 
court system.100 There exists a similar argument that while TPLF 
may or may not increase the amount of frivolous claims filed, it will 
generally increase the overall volume of litigation.101 Another com-
plaint against the industry is its perceived exploitation of consum-
ers.102 The vulnerability of consumers is certainly an issue in con-
sumer legal funding where individuals do not possess the leverage 
required to sufficiently negotiate protections into their contracts. The 
final area of concern involves lawyers’ ethical obligations and poten-
tial conflicts of interest that may be raised by TPLF arrangements. 
There is a legitimate concern that information exchanges between 
TPLF providers and litigants will waive attorney-client and work-
product privileges.103 Additionally, nothing currently prohibits TPLF 
providers from negotiating for control over decisional aspects of liti-
gation traditionally reserved for parties. Retention of this type of con-
trol by providers can interfere with an attorney’s exercise of inde-
pendent professional judgment and must be avoided.  
A.   Frivolous Claims and Fiduciary Duties 
Critics of the industry are quick to point to a host of negative ex-
ternalities associated with TPLF. Many argue the industry is an en-
gine for frivolous litigation.104 Critics argue that because TPLF pro-
viders fund many cases and thus are able to distribute risk across 
                                                                                                                  
 99. See Letter from Lisa A. Rickard, President, U.S. Chamber Inst. for Legal Reform, 
to Jonathan C. Rose, Sec’y of the Comm. on Rules of Practice and Procedure of the Admin. 
Office of the U.S. Courts (Apr. 9, 2014) [hereinafter Letter from Lisa A. Rickard], 
http://www.instituteforlegalreform.com/uploads/sites/1/4_-_FINAL_VERSION_-_TPLF_ 
Disclosure_letter_4_9.pdf.  
 100. See BEISNER & RUBIN, supra note 94, at 4. 
 101. Rodak, supra note 54, at 519. 
 102. See id. at 517-18. 
 103. See MOLOT, supra note 18, at 13.  
 104. See Rubin, supra note 58, at 682 (discussing the potential increase in meritless 
and opportunistic claims as a result of an increase in the pool of resources available to fund 
litigation).  
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their portfolio of investments, the risks associated with funding a 
single claim are negligible.105 They claim this higher risk appetite 
combined with providers’ single-minded pursuit of a return on capital 
contributes to increased frivolous litigation.106 This argument does 
not stand on firm ground, however.107 TPLF providers are indeed in-
terested in earning a handsome return on capital, but this incentiviz-
es TPLF providers only to advance money to plaintiffs with meritori-
ous claims. In the words of one of the largest providers in today’s in-
dustry, “[f]unding meritless suits is a sure way to lose money.”108 
TPLF providers in the commercial context conduct significant due 
diligence before moving forward with an investment because they 
offer substantial nonrecourse investments.109 TPLF providers assess 
a number of factors including the type and strength of a case, juris-
diction, evidence, potential damages, settlement prospects, and ex-
pertise of counsel.110  
Ethical standards also function to negate the argument that TPLF 
increases the volume of frivolous claims filed in court. Professional 
responsibility guidelines prohibit attorneys from using their services 
to support frivolous claims.111 While these guidelines certainly do not 
ensure eradication of frivolous litigation in our justice system, they 
are an example of an already established procedural protection appli-
cable to the TPLF industry. Furthermore, the largest TPLF providers 
are publicly traded entities.112 The officers and directors of these pub-
licly traded entities are subject to fiduciary duties and are required 
by law to make business decisions in the best interests of their 
shareholders.113 It remains a question of first impression whether or 
the extent to which corporate law and the business judgment rule 
may exculpate TPLF providers from negligent investments in litiga-
tion. As previously mentioned, only the largest TPLF providers are 
publicly traded and subject to fiduciary duties. The regulatory solu-
tion proposed in this Note suggests TPLF providers should be re-
quired to register with the SEC as investment advisers, which are 
                                                                                                                  
 105. See BEISNER & RUBIN, supra note 94, at 12. 
 106. See id. at 677.  
 107. See Shannon, supra note 50, at 875 (“It is not in the funder’s interest to fund frivo-
lous cases, because the funder would incur only costs without benefits when the case fails, 
and a court may sanction the funded party for bringing a frivolous case.”). 
 108. See MOLOT, supra note 18, at 16.  
 109. See, e.g., Funding Overview, supra note 13.  
 110. Id. 
 111. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 3.1 (AM. BAR ASS’N 1983).  
 112. See, e.g., Burch, supra note 39, at 1303.  
 113. Cede & Co. v. Technicolor, Inc., 634 A.2d 345, 360 (1993) (“Directors are charged 
with an unyielding fiduciary duty to protect the interests of the corporation and to act in 
the best interests of its shareholders.”). 
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also fiduciaries.114 This will effectively ensure all entities providing 
TPLF are subject to fiduciary duties and make investment decisions 
in their clients’ best interests.  
A related argument is that TPLF increases the volume of litiga-
tion generally.115 TPLF does propose to give some plaintiffs access to 
the civil justice system that they otherwise would not have. Empiri-
cal evidence suggests, however, that the majority of TPLF agree-
ments are entered into after a case has been filed.116 While plaintiffs 
may file a case they otherwise would not file in hopes of retaining 
financing, the amount of parties willing to take this risk is unlikely 
to contribute to a significant overall increase in litigation. Further-
more, most TPLF agreements are the result of attorney referrals.117 
To this day, many successful attorneys with large portfolios of con-
tingent fee cases are not even aware the TPLF industry exists. Its 
relative obscurity weakens the idea that it is currently abused to in-
crease the general volume of litigation. 118 
B.   Consumer Vulnerability 
There is a concern that the consumer legal funding market wrong-
fully takes advantage of consumers.119 As previously mentioned, the 
consumers in this area are usually victims of accidents.120 These are 
individuals without the financial and business acumen to effectively 
negotiate agreements with sophisticated providers in this area. Pro-
viders argue that the exorbitant rates charged are appropriate for the 
risks taken, but some question the actual extent of risk involved.121 
Proponents of the consumer legal funding industry argue that they 
provide credit to high-risk consumers who would not be able to obtain 
credit otherwise.122 Such a subprime consumer credit market exists in 
the form of payday loans and other services which have been heavily 
regulated or outright prohibited by many states. As the consumer 
legal funding industry lacks many substantive regulations found in 
                                                                                                                  
 114. STAFF OF THE INVESTMENT ADVISER REGULATION OFFICE, U.S. SEC. & EXCHANGE 
COMM’N, REGULATION OF INVESTMENT ADVISERS BY THE U.S. SECURITIES & EXCHANGE 
COMMISSION 22 (2013), http://www.sec.gov/about/offices/oia/oia_investman/rplaze-042012. 
pdf. 
 115. See Rodak, supra note 54, at 519.  
 116. Id.  
 117. See id.  
 118. See id.  
 119. See Garber, supra note 14, at 12.  
 120. See supra text accompanying note 8. 
 121. See Cristina Merrill, Judgment Call: Firms That Lend to Personal-Injury Plain-
tiffs Take Steps to Improve Their Bad-Guy Image, CRAIN’S N.Y. BUS., Jan. 27, 2003 (ques-
tioning whether the risk is great enough to justify high rates). 
 122. See Rodak, supra note 54, at 514.  
2016]  THIRD-PARTY LITIGATION FINANCE 1061 
 
the prime lending market, this Note proposes a regulatory solution: 
the outright prohibition of the consumer legal funding market.  
C.   Lawyers’ Ethical Obligations 
The most concerning issues raised regarding the TPLF industry 
are the perceived conflicts of interest it creates between attorneys, 
litigants and funders as well as its effect on lawyers’ ability to con-
form to rules of professional responsibility. These issues were treated 
extensively in the ABA Commission’s White Paper on Alternative 
Litigation Finance.123 Two scenarios and associated concerns are re-
peated in the literature discussing the TPLF industry’s potential ef-
fects on ethical obligations. First, exchanges of information between 
the provider and the litigant before an agreement is consummated 
have the potential to waive the crucial attorney-client and work-
product privileges.124 In order to conduct the due diligence necessary 
to make successful investments, TPLF providers seek information 
about a case before agreeing to fund it.125 The provision of privileged 
information to a third party functions to waive the specific privilege 
associated with the information.126 Avoiding waiver of these privileg-
es is absolutely crucial, and attorneys must take special care to en-
sure they remain intact. TPLF providers argue that much of the in-
formation they seek is factual in nature and therefore discoverable by 
the party’s opponent in any case.127  They argue that while many 
TPLF providers in the UK seek counsels’ legal opinions and analysis 
of the underlying case, a successful TPLF provider does not rely sole-
ly on counsels’ legal analysis but independently analyzes the merits 
on their own.128 The ability to accurately and independently analyze 
the merits of a case is crucial to the success of TPLF providers be-
cause litigants and their attorneys have an incentive to couch their 
case in as favorable terms as possible in order to secure funding. Ad-
ditionally, TPLF providers argue that information exchanges can be 
carefully structured so as to avoid the waiver of any privilege.129 In 
fact, other industries have confronted and successfully avoided this 
                                                                                                                  
 123. ABA COMM’N ON ETHICS 20/20, supra note 85. 
 124. See MOLOT, supra note 18, at 13; see also Jonathan T. Molot, A Market in Litiga-
tion Risk, 76 U. CHI. L. REV. 367, 381, 390-92 (“[T]here are work product and privilege is-
sues that must be addressed if information is to be shared with a third party seeking to 
price and assume litigation risk from a defendant.”).  
 125. See Lazar Emanuel, Overall View of Litigation Funding Industry, N.Y. LEGAL 
ETHICS REP. (Feb. 1, 2011), http://www.newyorklegalethics.com/an-overall-view-of-the-
litigation-funding-industry/. 
 126. See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 1.6 cmt. 18 (AM. BAR ASS’N 1983).  
 127. MOLOT, supra note 18, at 13.  
 128. Id.  
 129. Id.  
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very problem.130 Collaborations with TPLF providers should not be 
treated any differently than discussions about a defendant’s case 
with its insurer. Moreover, exchanges of information are almost ex-
clusively carried out according to confidentiality agreements. Disclo-
sure of information to a potential source of funding under a confiden-
tiality agreement should not meaningfully risk exposure of that in-
formation to an adversary and therefore does not waive the crucial 
privileges protecting that information.131 The public policy considera-
tions behind protecting privileges in this type of information ex-
change are strong. Statutes enacted in Alaska and California to solve 
this problem in the context of insurance are exemplary.132 
The second major area of concern results from TPLF providers re-
servingcontrol over litigation decisions. Some providers attempt to 
exercise control over the litigation they are invested in, ostensibly to 
protect their investment.133 Typical reservations of control extend as 
far as choice of counsel and direction of litigation strategy including 
settlement negotiations. Some TPLF providers, however, recognize 
the dangers associated with retaining this type of control and adver-
tise themselves as purely passive providers of financing.134 The reten-
tion of control over decision-making by TPLF providers interferes 
substantially with a lawyer’s independent professional judgment. Ac-
cording to rules of professional responsibility, lawyers must at all 
times maintain their “independent professional judgment.”135 Ceding 
control over decisions informed by such judgment almost certainly 
runs afoul of model rules of professional conduct. The regulatory so-
lution proposed in this Note attempts to ensure that lawyers are able 
to freely exercise their independent professional judgment once a 
provider gets involved. The absolute prohibition of any type of control 
over litigation and decision-making by attorneys and litigants is a 
necessary component of any successful regulatory scheme applicable 
to the TPLF industry.136 While some ethical issues exist outside of 
this context,137 they are eminently more manageable.  
                                                                                                                  
 130. See John P. Ludington, Annotation, Insured-Insurer Communications as Privi-
leged, 55 A.L.R. 4th 336, § 2 (1987) (discussing the attorney-client privilege in the insur-
ance context).   
 131. See id.  
 132. See ALASKA STAT. § 21.96.100(e) (2015); CAL. CIV. CODE § 2860(d) (West 2015).  
 133. See Burch, supra note 39, at 1320-21.  
 134. See Anglo-Dutch Petroleum Int’l, Inc. v. Haskell, 193 S.W.3d 87, 104 (Tex. Ct. 
App. 2006) (discussing the lack of evidence that the provider exercised any control over the 
lawsuit); ABA COMM’N ON ETHICS 20/20, supra note 85, at 26.  
 135. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 1.2 (AM. BAR ASS’N 1983).  
 136. See BEISNER & RUBIN, supra note 94, at 12; MAVRAKIS, supra note 96, at 6, 8. 
 137. Other issues include potential waiver of privileges, confidentiality, and conflicts of 
interest.  
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Further, retention of control over decision-making has the poten-
tial to create confusion surrounding which party is truly driving the 
litigation.138 Courts acknowledge that “hidden funding can introduce 
a dynamic into a plaintiff’s case—an agenda unrelated to its merits, a 
resistance to compromise—that otherwise might not be present and, 
unless known, cannot be managed or evaluated.”139 This dynamic is 
incredibly concerning in a landscape where TPLF providers are free 
to retain whatever control they are able to negotiate away from liti-
gants and their counsel. A sufficient prohibition on retention of this 
type of control should be enough to ameliorate the issues in that con-
text. Severe restriction or outright prohibition of the consumer legal 
funding industry will address the concerns regarding vulnerability of 
consumers. Imposing fiduciary duties on TPLF providers will address 
concerns regarding facilitation of frivolous claims. Conflicts of inter-
est and other ethical challenges are raised throughout the industry, 
but TPLF transactions can be carefully structured to avoid these is-
sues. Even where these precautions are taken, however, there exists 
a troubling dynamic in relation to the effect of financing on settle-
ment incentives.  
V.   EFFECT ON SETTLEMENT 
Settlement is a crucial part of the American system of justice. The 
vast majority of cases do not reach trial and are instead resolved by 
alternative dispute methods. Less than ten percent of cases in the 
United States are decided at trial.140 The extent to which our justice 
system embraces the settlement of cases, like the TPLF industry, has 
its critics and proponents. Settlement is encouraged by a number of 
factors present in our judicial system, including court rules of proce-
dure and judges’ ability and willingness to participate in and facili-
tate settlements. Settlement is viewed as a way to resolve legal dis-
putes with increased efficiency while preserving scarce judicial re-
sources.141 Trials are considered wasteful since both sides expend ar-
guably unnecessary funds and resources going to trial.142 Settlement 
also avoids the emotional cost involved in seeing a trial through to 
verdict, including all opportunity costs associated with doing so. Crit-
ics of settlement argue that trials educate the public and that the in-
creasingly private nature of settlement reduces the transparency of 
and public access to the justice system.143 Bargaining imbalances of-
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 140. Rodak, supra note 54, at 519.  
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ten present in settlement negotiations have been criticized as pre-
venting the equal application of justice.144 Despite these contentions, 
the modern American justice system continues to embrace and pro-
mote settlement. For this reason, it is important to understand how 
TPLF will affect parties’ incentives to settle cases.  
Inherent bargaining imbalances exist between parties in legal 
proceedings. One party often enjoys far more resources than the oth-
er,145 facilitating informational asymmetries.146 Other than strict pe-
cuniary differentiation, risk preferences also vary widely among liti-
gants. A one-time litigant will approach the litigation process in a 
wildly different manner than a repeat litigant, even if they enjoy sim-
ilar resources. Sometimes the weaker party is the plaintiff, who can-
not credibly threaten to go to trial against a well-heeled corporate 
defendant. Other times the weaker party is the defendant, who can-
not risk a larger-than-anticipated adverse judgment or is distracted 
by other business dealings.147 These dynamics are often the driving 
force behind settlement despite being unrelated to the merits of the 
underlying proceeding. A judicial system that values justice above all 
should be concerned with the extent to which cases are resolved 
based on bargaining imbalances completely unrelated to the merits of 
the case. Plaintiffs who have meritorious claims but few resources 
are often induced to settle at an amount that under-compensates for 
their true injury.148 Defendants who are unable to bear the risk of an 
adverse settlement in a class action suit will often overpay in their 
settlement.149 If either party can credibly threaten to go to trial, they 
gain leverage at the negotiating table. TPLF providers level the play-
ing field by enabling companies with valid claims or defenses but few 
resources to obtain fair settlements.  
By removing the competitive advantage that one party has over 
another in litigation, the TPLF industry will affect parties’ settle-
ment incentives. Both critics and supporters of TPLF see support for 
their perspective in how TPLF affects settlement incentives.150 Sup-
porters claim that because TPLF levels the playing field as far as re-
sources and risk preferences, more claims will be resolved according 
to the merits of the suit, regardless of whether the suit is settled or 
taken to trial. 151  This would mean previously under-compensated 
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plaintiffs would receive their proper due, while overpaying defend-
ants would only be liable for the actual amount of damage they are 
responsible for. 152  Detractors, however, raise two troubling effects 
TPLF may have on settlement incentives. Terms of financing will 
without a doubt affect a litigant’s decision to settle. A rational liti-
gant may be reluctant to accept what might otherwise be a reasona-
ble settlement offer in consideration of its obligation to repay a TPLF 
provider.153 Further, the nonrecourse nature of financing compounds 
this issue as litigants will be ambivalent between settling for less 
than the amount owed to the provider and losing at trial.154 In each 
case where financing has been provided, the litigant will be able to 
calculate a break-even number that essentially sets a floor on the 
amount the litigant is willing to settle for.155 For these reasons, critics 
claim the TPLF industry deters settlement, frustrating the beneficial 
effects discussed above.  
Interestingly, the presence of TPLF may also over-incentivize set-
tlement. Depending on the terms of TPLF agreements, a plaintiff 
may have an incentive to settle early and for a low amount.156 While 
some TPLF agreements tie repayment to the amount advanced or to 
the amount of any award, others include terms that link repayment 
to the amount of time elapsed between investment and resolution of 
the case. Still other TPLF repayment schedules provide for excessive 
interest rates.157 If the transaction is structured so providers take a 
larger percentage of any award the longer a suit continues or charge 
exorbitant (and even increasing) interest rates as payments are 
made, a rational consumer will be incentivized to accept an early but 
low settlement offer even if it does not adequately compensate them 
according to the merits of the case. The issue lurking behind the con-
sequences of TPLF on parties’ settlement incentives is the extent to 
which these incentives prohibit attorneys from exercising their inde-
pendent professional judgment. Settlement decisions are the preroga-
tive of the client, but attorneys are expected to provide competent 
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advice to the client in their consideration of settlement offers.158 In 
each of the above scenarios, a client could have acted reasonably ei-
ther in rejecting a reasonable settlement offer or accepting an early, 
low offer. There are many aspects that inform a client’s decision to 
settle, and the terms of a TPLF agreement should be added to the 
list. Attorneys are obliged to provide advice based on their client’s 
best interests, all things considered. As the ABA acknowledged, “All 
fee arrangements create conflicts of interest to some extent.”159 TPLF 
does not create novel ethical issues. The issues it does create can be 
mitigated if only attorneys would act with care.  
VI.   REGULATORY SOLUTION 
The TPLF industry boldly marries cutting edge financial analysis 
with the steeped-in-history traditional professionalism of the bar. 
This cross-discipline dynamic uniquely defines the industry and de-
mands a tailored regulatory framework. Part of the confusion sur-
rounding TPLF stems from the piecemeal approach to regulation 
taken by courts in interpreting the archaic legal doctrines discussed 
above.160 Lawmakers in this country have yet to address regulation of 
the industry in a meaningful way despite numerous calls to do so. 
Intelligent regulation of this industry will achieve maximum protec-
tion for consumers and serve to streamline the industry’s growth. 
Most important, it will protect the integrity of the American justice 
system.  
The ILR proposed a federal regulatory scheme for the TPLF in-
dustry in 2012.161 That proposal suggested appointing the Federal 
Trade Commission (“FTC”) as the federal agency responsible for reg-
ulating the TPLF industry and proposed a number of interesting 
substantive regulations,162 some of which are foundational and there-
fore also adopted in this proposal. The most logical approach to regu-
lation of the TPLF industry is, for all of the reasons discussed in the 
ILR proposal, to establish a new statutory scheme authorizing a fed-
eral administrative agency to regulate the industry. This is prefera-
ble to a state-by-state regulatory framework, exemplified by the in-
surance industry or by state blue-sky securities laws.163 Instead of the 
FTC, however, the Securities and Exchange Commission (“SEC”) is 
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in a much better position to regulate the TPLF industry because 
TPLF providers are very similar to entities the SEC already regu-
lates: hedge funds and investment advisers. As previously men-
tioned, TPLF providers approach the provision of financing as an in-
vestment, conducting significant due diligence before advancing 
funds,164 just like hedge fund and investment advisers do. Moreover, 
the SEC has already promulgated many regulations for broker-
dealers and investment advisers that are applicable to the TPLF in-
dustry such as custody and net capital requirements as well as books 
and records requirements. 165  This Note accordingly proposes that 
TPLF providers be required to register with the SEC as investment 
advisers. 
First, investment advisers are fiduciaries. They are obligated to 
make investment decisions in their clients’ best interests.166 If all 
TPLF providers are required to be fiduciaries, many of the ethical 
problems discussed in this Note will be mitigated. Second, the SEC’s 
already established regulatory framework for broker-dealers and in-
vestment advisers aims to achieve many of the same goals as poten-
tial regulation of the TPLF industry. These aims include the collec-
tion of necessary data on regulated entities, deterrence of and protec-
tion from fraud, prevention of unfit persons from managing regulated 
entities, and adoption of compliance procedures necessary to protect 
consumers. 167  Because these frameworks are already established, 
there will be significantly less work involved in tailoring these laws 
and regulations to the TPLF industry as compared with the whole-
sale creation of a regulatory framework under the FTC. SEC regula-
tions may be incorporated by reference, achieving the same effect as 
if an entire framework were created from scratch under the FTC. 
These rules will require TPLF providers to maintain specific policies 
and procedures regarding privacy, codes of ethics, management pro-
cesses, funding procedures, the accuracy of disclosures, and compli-
ance programs.168 These policies and procedures will ensure TPLF 
providers comply with the federal statutory framework to be created 
contemporaneously. There still remain certain issues unique to the 
TPLF industry that such a comprehensive regulatory regime must 
address.  
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TPLF agreements should be discoverable. As previously men-
tioned, the ILR has recently proposed an amendment to the Federal 
Rules of Civil Procedure that would accomplish this.169 The Commit-
tee agreed to consider the proposal. If TPLF is to become a perma-
nent fixture in American civil litigation, its use should be transpar-
ent. Transparency will enable courts to ensure compliance with ethi-
cal obligations, protecting the integrity of the judicial system. It will 
also inform parties as to who is really on the other side of an ac-
tion.170 Further, the disclosure of agreements will inform courts’ deci-
sions regarding whether to impose cost-shifting measures in cases 
with onerous discovery.171 Finally, the ILR argues disclosure of TPLF 
agreements will also inform courts’ decisions about whether and to 
what extent to impose sanctions.172  
 TPLF providers should be prohibited from exercising control over 
any aspect of the litigation process.173 They should not be able to con-
trol the filing of the lawsuit, selection of counsel, recruiting of wit-
nesses, or settlement decisions. A disclosure in an Oasis Legal Fund-
ing agreement is instructive: 
PURCHASER OASIS LEGAL FINANCE, LLC, AS THE 
COMPANY AGREES THAT IT SHALL HAVE NO RIGHT TO 
AND WILL NOT MAKE ANY DECISIONS WITH RESPECT TO 
THE CONDUCT OF THE UNDERLYING LEGAL CLAIM OR 
ANY SETTLEMENT OR RESOLUTION THEREOF AND THAT 
THE RIGHT TO MAKE THOSE DECICIONS REMAINS SOLELY 
WITH YOU AND YOUR ATTORNEY IN THE CIVIL ACTION OR 
CLAIM.174 
This single prohibition will have a positive and far-reaching effect 
on the TPLF industry. It will ensure consumers’ rights are protected 
during the course of litigation and that TPLF providers act ethically 
and do not increase the cost of proceedings. By ensuring that liti-
gants make independent strategic decisions with the advice of coun-
sel, all parties involved in the transaction benefit.  
 Law firms and lawyers should be prohibited from referring clients 
to TPLF providers in which they have any type of financial inter-
est.175 Lawyers should also be prohibited from benefitting financially 
from the referral of clients to TPLF providers.176 TPLF companies are 
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often publicly traded or supported by popular investment funds in 
which judges, jurors, and attorneys may have financial interests. 
This requirement will function as a corollary to the above disclosure 
requirement and will assist in the identification of potential ethical 
issues.  
VII.   CONCLUSION 
There is evidence of a shift in the overarching perception of the 
practice of law from a profession above the ethics of the marketplace 
to a business with a focus on the bottom line. Some attorneys em-
brace the shift, joining large law firms that seek to resemble hedge 
funds and other profit-making ventures by focusing on advertising, 
cutting costs, and collecting revenue. Many lawyers, however, con-
tinue to view themselves as professionals rather than businessmen. 
Business is inherent in the practice of law. Some lawyers just choose 
to ignore it. When lawyers offer alternative fee arrangements to their 
clients, they are offering services entirely separate and apart from 
their legal expertise. By assuming the entire responsibility of risk 
management and financing, the TPLF industry will allow lawyers to 
focus entirely on providing high quality legal services. TPLF is an 
emerging industry that has much to offer the evolving legal profes-
sion and the business clients it serves. The embrace of an intelligent 
regulatory scheme will serve to cultivate the positive aspects of the 
industry while maintaining the integrity of the legal profession and 
our justice system. 
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